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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is case about prosecutorial misconduct. In securing a guilty verdict for two drug
offenses, the prosecutor repeatedly commented and elicited testimony on Janell Ozuna’s exercise
of her right to remain silent in order to prove her guilt. This was misconduct, in violation of
Ms. Ozuna’s constitutional rights to silence and a fair trial. In addition to using Ms. Ozuna’s
silence against her, the prosecutor elicited testimony on Ms. Ozuna’s prior police contact after
the district court ruled such evidence was inadmissible. This violation of the district court’s
ruling, despite the prosecutor’s assurance to follow it, was also misconduct, in violation of
Ms. Ozuna’s fair trial right. Although these errors are unpreserved, they rise to the level of
fundamental error. Due to these errors, Ms. Ozuna respectfully requests that this Court vacate her
judgment of conviction and remand her case for new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
One morning in early September, Ms. Ozuna went outside to get a diaper bag from her
car. (Tr. Vol. I,1 p.196, L.20–p.197, L.5, p.197, Ls.15–17.) Ms. Ozuna and her family had just
gotten into an argument. (Tr. Vol. I, p.129, Ls.6–23, p.196, L.20–p.197, L.8.) Ms. Ozuna was

1

The appellate record contains one .PDF document with three separate transcripts, each with its
own pagination. For ease of reference, citations to the three transcripts will refer to the separate
transcripts by volume and its internal pagination. Citations to “Tr. Vol. I” will refer to the first
transcript in the document (pages 1–55 of total document), containing day one of the jury trial,
held on February 15, 2018. Citations to “Tr. Vol. II” will refer to the second transcript in the
document (pages 56–59 of total document), containing the pre-trial conference, held on February
13, 2018. Citations to “Tr. Vol. III” will refer to the third and final transcript in the document
(pages 60–88 of total document), containing day two of the jury trial, held on February 16, 2018,
and multiple sentencing proceedings.
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also late for work, and it was her son’s first day of school. (Tr. Vol. I, p.198, Ls.11–13.) Suffice
it to say, Ms. Ozuna was stressed and preoccupied. (Tr. Vol. I, p.198, L.14, p.199, Ls.15–18.)
Before grabbing the diaper bag, Ms. Ozuna went to pick up some trash on the curb.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.198, Ls.3–5.) Her house was on the corner and surrounded by a fence. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.197, Ls.21–22, p.198, L.25–p.199, L.2.) Trash, leaves, and other debris could accumulate on
the side of the fence near the curb. (Tr. Vol. I, p.197, Ls.23–25, p.198, L.22–p.199, L.2.)
Ms. Ozuna saw a pair of gloves on the road near the curb and picked them up. (Tr. Vol. I, p.198,
Ls.3–6, p.199, Ls.11–13.)
During this time, Officer Parsons was patrolling the area near Ms. Ozuna’s house.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.129, L.6–20, p.13-, L.5) He heard a call related to the family disturbance and
decided to respond. (Tr. Vol. I, p.129, L.21–p.130, L.7.) When Officer Parsons arrived,
Ms. Ozuna was standing on the sidewalk outside her home. (Tr. Vol. I, p.130, Ls.15–18.)
Ms. Ozuna had her cell phone in one hand and the gloves in the other. (Tr. Vol. I, p.131, Ls.13–
15.)
Officer Parsons and Ms. Ozuna began talking outside about the family disturbance.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.143, Ls.15–19.) Immediately, Officer Parsons saw a glass pipe with burn marks
wrapped in the gloves. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.131, L.22–p.133, L.11.) He believed the burn marks
indicated the pipe was used to smoke methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.132, Ls.4–14, p.133,
Ls.5–8.) Despite seeing this pipe, Officer Parsons did not ask Ms. Ozuna about the gloves, try to
seize the pipe, or conduct field sobriety tests.
During their conversation, Ms. Ozuna went to point with her hand holding the gloves,
and the pipe fell out. (Tr. Vol. I, p.133, Ls.13–21.) It shattered on the sidewalk. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.133, Ls.22–25.) Officer Parsons then arrested Ms. Ozuna. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 134, Ls.14–18.) The
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pipe contained a trace amount of methamphetamine residue adhered to the glass. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.179, L.19–p.180, L.5.)
The State charged Ms. Ozuna with possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of paraphernalia, the
pipe, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.21–22.) These charges represented not only her
first felony offense, but also her first drug-related ones. (Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”),2 pp.9–12.) Ms. Ozuna pled not guilty and exercised her right to a jury trial. (R., p.25.)
Just before trial, the district court instructed the prosecutor on Officer Parsons’s
testimony. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.20–p.13, L.2.) The district court noted that Officer Parsons had
reported in his probable cause affidavit that he identified Ms. Ozuna from “previous contacts
with her.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.21–22; see also PSI, p.1.) The district court held this statement
was “improper.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.13, L.2.) Accordingly, the prosecutor assured the district court that
Officer Parsons would not inform the jury of his prior contacts:
Your Honor, I did have a conversation with Officer Parsons yesterday. He knows
that at least in the State’s case in chief, that those two areas3 are not to be brought
up. He knows that even if he thinks I’m asking that question, I’m not, and he is
not to volunteer that information.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.13, Ls.3–8.) Although the prosecutor made this assurance, it did not play out that
way at trial. During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Officer Parsons, the prosecutor asked
Officer Parsons how he identified Ms. Ozuna once he arrived at her house. (Tr. Vol. I, p.130,
L.22.) Officer Parsons answered, “I was able to identify her from a previous contact. So as soon

2

Citations to the PSI refer to the forty-nine-page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
3
The district court also held improper Officer Parsons’s reference to transporting Ms. Ozuna to
the police station so officers could question her about another investigation. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12,
L.20–p.13, L.2.) This was not brought up at trial.
3

as I saw her, I recognized her.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.130, Ls.23–4.) The prosecutor did nothing to
remedy this violation of the district court’s ruling.
Along with this improper testimony, the prosecutor repeatedly referenced Ms. Ozuna’s
silence during her arrest. The prosecutor identified Ms. Ozuna’s failure to deny ownership of the
pipe in opening statements. (Tr. Vol. I, p.122, L.25–p.123, L.4.) The prosecutor also elicited
testimony from Officer Parsons on Ms. Ozuna’s failure to “adamantly” or “repeatedly” deny that
the pipe was hers. (Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L.1–p.135, L.4.) Officer Parsons testified that Ms. Ozuna
“did state at some point during our contact that it wasn’t hers,” but made no other statements.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L.1–p.135, L.4.)
Ms. Ozuna testified in her defense. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.196, L.5–p.208, L.15.) She told the
jury about her stressful morning and testified that she had picked up the gloves without thinking
about it. (Tr. Vol. I, p.196, L.24–p.199, L.23.) She said that she had never seen the gloves before.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.198, Ls.20–21.) She also said that she did not know there was a pipe inside the
gloves until it until fell out and broke on the sidewalk. (Tr. Vol. I, p.200, Ls.4–7.) The prosecutor
extensively cross-examined Ms. Ozuna on her silence and her failure to give any explanation to
Officer Parsons about the pipe. (Tr. Vol. I, p.205, L.1–p.206, L.12, p.207, L.23–p.208, L.8.)
In closing, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Ms. Ozuna’s failure to speak up after her
arrest and tell Officer Parsons, “[T]hat’s not mine. I don’t know what that is. I was just picking
up trash. I didn’t know what was in the gloves,” proved that she had possession and knowledge
of the pipe. (Tr. Vol. III, p.16, Ls.12–22.) The prosecutor also argued that an innocent person
would deny knowledge of the pipe, thus implying that only a guilty person would remain silent.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.29, Ls.8–25.) The jury was instructed to “decide what, if any, statements were
made” by Ms. Ozuna “and give them the weight you believe is appropriate, just as you would

4

any other evidence or statements in the case.” (R., p.77.) There was no limiting instruction on
drawing inferences of guilt from Ms. Ozuna’s exercise of her right to remain silent during her
arrest. (See R., pp.66–83 (final jury instructions).)
The jury found Ms. Ozuna guilty as charged. (R., p.84; Tr. Vol. III, p.34, L.14–p.35, L.7.)
The district court sentenced her to five years, with one year fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.87, L.16–p.88, L.1.) Ms. Ozuna timely appealed from the district court’s
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.119–20, 131–33.)

5

ISSUES
I.

Did the prosecutor violate Ms. Ozuna’s constitutional rights to remain silent and to a fair
trial by repeatedly using evidence of Ms. Ozuna’s silence to imply guilt?

II.

Did the prosecutor violate Ms. Ozuna’s constitutional right to a fair trial by eliciting
testimony previously deemed inadmissible on Ms. Ozuna’s prior police contact?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The Prosecutor Violated Ms. Ozuna’s Constitutional Rights To Remain Silent And To A Fair
Trial By Repeatedly Using Evidence Of Ms. Ozuna’s Silence To Imply Guilt

A.

Introduction
Ms. Ozuna submits the prosecutor committed misconduct by explicitly eliciting

testimony and commenting on Ms. Ozuna’s silence to prove guilt. This prosecutorial
misconduct, which occurred during the prosecutor’s opening statement, case-in-chief,
cross-examination of Ms. Ozuna, and closing argument, violated Ms. Ozuna’s unwaived
constitutional rights to remain silent and to a fair trial. Although this error is unpreserved, these
constitutional violations are clear from the record and affected the trial’s outcome. In light of this
error, Ms. Ozuna respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and
remand her case for a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
For unobjected-to errors, the Court applies the fundamental error standard:
Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the
burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or
more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision);
and (3) was not harmless.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). This Court recently clarified prongs two and three of
this standard in State v. Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673 (Mar. 15, 2019) (substitute
opinion) (not yet final). To satisfy prong two, this Court held that the defendant must point to
“evidence in the record” to support the claim that trial counsel’s failure to object was not a
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tactical decision. Miller, No. 46517, at p.3. To satisfy prong three, this Court held that the
defendant must demonstrate that the clear error “actually affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.” Miller, No.46517, at p.4.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Using Ms. Ozuna’s Silence To Imply Guilt,
This Error Is Clear From The Record, And It Is Not Harmless
Ms. Ozuna contends the prosecutor committed misconduct with multiple comments and

elicitation of testimony on Ms. Ozuna’s exercise of her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
This misconduct, though not objected-to, rises to the level of fundamental error. Each prong of
the fundamental error standard will be addressed in turn.

1.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, In Violation Of Ms. Ozuna’s Rights To
Remain Silent And To A Fair Trial, By Eliciting Testimony On Her Silence
During Her Arrest And Using Her Silence To Imply Guilt

The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
states in relevant part, “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself[.]” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees that “[n]o
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 13. See also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011). “The U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted this right also to bar the prosecution from commenting on a defendant’s invocation of
that right.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–14
(1965)).
To clarify “when and how” the prosecutor can use silence at trial, the Court has divided
silence into pre- and post-arrest and pre- and post-Miranda4 categories. In instances of postarrest, post-Miranda silence, “a prosecutor may not use evidence of . . . silence for either

4

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), or as substantive evidence of guilt in the
State’s case-in-chief, Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986).” Ellington, 151 Idaho
at 60. In instances of post-arrest, but pre-Miranda, silence, a prosecutor may not use “silence to
infer guilt in its case-in-chief.” Id. (citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820–21 (1998)); see
also State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 234 (2014) (“It is clearly erroneous for a prosecutor to
introduce evidence of the defendant’s postarrest silence for the purpose of raising an inference of
guilt.” (quoting State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 591 (1983)). Similarly, “[i]n cases of preMiranda, pre-arrest silence, the prosecutor may not use that evidence ‘solely for the purpose of
implying guilt.’” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 147 (2014) (quoting State v. Parton, 154 Idaho
558, 566 (2013)). A prosecutor may, however, use silence to impeach the defendant in postarrest, but pre-Miranda, situations. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60. In addition, a prosecutor may use
silence for impeachment purposes if the silence is pre-arrest, pre-Miranda. Id.
The Court has also broadly defined the conduct that constitutes an improper comment on
silence. For example, “[i]t is well-established that a prosecutor commits misconduct by
deliberately eliciting or attempting to elicit inadmissible testimony.” State v. Johnson, 163 Idaho
412, 423 (2018) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572 (2007); State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho
679, 684 (Ct. App. 2010)). An attempt to elicit testimony on silence includes engaging in “a line
of questioning” that “would create a high risk of an improper comment” on silence. Ellington,
151 Idaho at 61. Yet not even deliberate or risky questioning is required to show misconduct. If a
prosecutor elicits unsolicited testimony that comments on a defendant’s silence, that testimony is
“imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. A witness’s
“gratuitous comment” is still misconduct. Johnson, 163 Idaho at 423.
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Here, the prosecutor deliberately elicited testimony on Ms. Ozuna’s post-arrest silence
and used that silence as substantive evidence of guilt.5 The prosecutor flagged Ms. Ozuna’s
silence for the jury in opening statements, elicited testimony from Officer Parsons on
Ms. Ozuna’s silence, cross-examined Ms. Ozuna on her silence, and argued in closing that
Ms. Ozuna’s silence was evidence of guilt. These comments and elicitations of testimony on
silence were improper.
First, the prosecutor notified the jury in opening statements that Ms. Ozuna’s silence was
crucial to the State’s case. After the prosecutor explained to the jury that Officer Parsons “told
the defendant he had seen the pipe in her hand, he had seen it fall from her hand, and he’d seen it
break on the ground, and she was under arrest,” the prosecutor stated: “At this point the
defendant didn’t start to adamantly deny that it was hers. Instead, she turns around, puts her
hands behind her back, and is placed under arrest, only once telling Officer Parsons, ‘that pipe
wasn’t mine.’” (Tr. Vol. I, p.122, L.25–p.123, L.4.) The prosecutor’s statement that Ms. Ozuna
did not “adamantly deny” that the pipe was hers, i.e., remained silent, after her arrest was
misconduct by commenting on her silence to imply guilt.
Second, the prosecutor deliberately elicited testimony from Officer Parsons on
Ms. Ozuna’s silence:
Q. . . . Did the defendant react at all when the pipe broke on the ground?
A. Yes. She made the comment verbally, said, “Oh.” She looked at the pipe and
then looked up at me and then continued to talk about who was living on the
property.
Q. So she just continued in the conversation?
5

Similar to Ellington, it is “unclear” from the record whether Officer Parsons “Mirandized”
Ms. Ozuna once he placed her into custody. 151 Idaho at 60–61. But, also like Ellington,
Ms. Ozuna “was certainly in custody and under arrest at that time,” and therefore her “right to
silence was protected.” Id. at 61. The prosecutor could not use her silence to imply guilt. Id.
10

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. From before the pipe broke?
A. Yes.
Q. Where she was at in the conversation before the pipe broke? Sorry.
A. Correct. Yes.
Q. Okay. What did you do?
A. At that time I told her that I had seen the pipe fall out, hit the ground, and to
turn around and place her hands behind her back. And then I put her into
custody.
Q. Did she say anything to you?
A. No. Let me rephrase that. She did state at some point during our contact that
it wasn’t hers.
Q. Okay. Do you remember if it was right when you were placing her under
arrest, or later?
A. I don’t recall.
Q. Do you remember I guess maybe adamantly denying, like repeatedly saying
“That’s not mine”?
A. No. Not adamantly; no.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L.1–p.135, L.4 (emphasis added).) Once again, the prosecutor committed
misconduct by implying guilt from silence, this time by eliciting testimony on Ms. Ozuna’s
failure to “adamantly” deny the pipe was hers.
Third, the prosecutor cross-examined Ms. Ozuna on her silence. The prosecutor asked
Ms. Ozuna:
Q. . . . So when he did tell you that he was going to be placing you under arrest,
did you tell him that you had just been picking up trash then?
A. No.

11

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Outside the scope.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[MS. OZUNA]: There was no questions asked of where the pipe came from or
what.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay.
[MS. OZUNA]: Anything.
Q. (BY [THE PROSECUTOR]) But you didn’t say that you had just been picking
up trash?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t say that you had just picked up the gloves?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Now, I think there is, Officer Parsons did say at least at one point you
did say the pipe wasn’t yours?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. But you didn’t offer any other explanation?
A. No.
Q. Just, “The pipe is not mine”?
A. No. I don’t think I have to offer explanation, because I’m not guilty for it as
what I think, so. [sic]
Q. Okay. But I’m just asking. You didn’t tell -A. And for questions not being asked. I’m not going to respond to something that
can be used against me.
Q. And that’s your opinion. That’s absolutely fine. But I’m just asking you, you
didn’t tell Officer Parsons other than that one time, “That’s not my pipe”? You
didn’t say anything else?
A. No.
....
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Q. But at the time you were being placed under arrest, you were calm and not
adamantly denying that what you were being placed under arrest for, you weren’t
guilty of; is that correct?
A. Was I calm about it?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And you weren’t telling the officer at that point that the gloves weren’t
yours, the pipe wasn’t yours?
A. No.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.205, L.1–p.206, L.12, p.207, L.23–p.208, L.8 (emphasis added).) This crossexamination is replete with comments and elicitation of testimony on Ms. Ozuna’s silence. To
start, the prosecutor asked Ms. Ozuna three questions about failing to give any denials or
explanations to Officer Parsons after her arrest. Then, the prosecutor questioned why Ms. Ozuna
did not “offer any explanation” or continue to deny ownership of the pipe. Finally, the prosecutor
concluded with again asking Ms. Ozuna if she made any denials once she was placed under
arrest. These comments and elicitation of testimony also constituted misconduct because it
implied guilt from silence.6

6

This cross-examination does not fall under any impeachment purpose.
[T]he fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a
defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have
told the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier
silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to
challenge the defendant’s testimony as to his behavior following arrest.

Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620 n.11 (citation omitted). For example, the prosecution properly used a
defendant’s silence to rebut the defendant’s testimony that the police did not interview him about
the alleged crime. State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1, 5 (2005). This kind of situation did not occur
here because Ms. Ozuna never testified that she was not given the opportunity or did not talk to
Officer Parsons about the alleged offense. Pre-Miranda silence may also be used broadly to
impeach the defendant’s “story” on the stand. For example, the prosecution properly used a
13

Fourth, and finally, the prosecutor explicitly relied on evidence on Ms. Ozuna’s silence to
argue her guilt in closing. The prosecutor stated the disputed elements were whether Ms. Ozuna
possessed any amount of methamphetamine and “whether she knew it was methamphetamine
and/or believed it was a controlled substance.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.14, L.24–p.15, L.2.) To prove
knowledge, the prosecutor argued it was “obvious” that there was a pipe in the gloves and
Ms. Ozuna’s testimony that “[s]he just picked up a pair of gloves . . . doesn’t make sense.”
(Tr. Vol. III, p.15, Ls.19–23.) The prosecutor continued:
But what else can you look at? We can look at her reactions. Officer
Parsons described them. She even described them on the stand. When the pipe fell
out of her hand and broke onto the ground, she didn’t start staying, “That’s not
mine.” I didn’t even know it was in there. I was just picking up trash. Instead, she
tried to keep talking, trying to divert Officer Parsons’ attention elsewhere. Why
did she do this? Because, she knew that that pipe was in her hand. She knew she
could get in trouble. So she was hoping to distract Officer Parsons, hoping that
Officer Parsons wouldn’t notice.
What else can you look at? When Officer Parsons told her that she was
under arrest, she even told you she had a calm demeanor. She turned around, put
her hands behind her back and was led off. She didn’t start by saying, again,
“That’s not mine. I don’t know what that is. I was just picking up trash. I didn’t
know that was in the gloves.” Why didn’t she say any of that? Because, she knew
the pipe was in her hands. She knew what she was under arrest for. She knew why
she was in trouble. And now she’s come up with the story of “I was just picking
up trash.” She didn’t tell that story back on September 18, 2017. This is a story
she’s come up with since then to try and get out of getting in trouble today.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.15, L.24–p.27, L.2 (emphasis added).) In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued:
What else is reasonable? What else would your common sense tell you? Does
your common sense tell you that when you’re placed under arrest for an item
you’ve just picked up from trash that you didn’t even know was in your hand and
you’re being placed under arrest – what does your common sense tell you that
you would do, or that a reasonable person would do? I propose to you that a
defendant’s pre-Miranda silence to rebut the defendant’s testimony that claimed, for the first
time, the shooting was an accident. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628–29 (1993). But
here, Ms. Ozuna has not changed her “story.” Officer Parsons and Ms. Ozuna both testified that
Ms. Ozuna told Officer Parsons just one time that the pipe was not hers. (Tr. Vol. I, p.134,
Ls.21–23, p.204, Ls.1–3.) The prosecutor did not use Ms. Ozuna’s subsequent silence to question
her changing story, but to imply her guilt.
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reasonable person would say, “That’s not mine. I just picked that up. It was in the
gloves. I didn’t even know it was there.” A reasonable person would tell that
story. If it was the truth, you would tell the story. When it’s a story that you’re
making up to get out trouble, you tell it six months later. You tell it for the first
time in a courtroom to try and avoid getting in trouble. So what’s reasonable?
What makes sense?
(Tr. Vol. III, p.29, Ls.8–25 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor here went far beyond any
purported impeachment purpose in commenting on Ms. Ozuna’s silence. Rather, the prosecutor
repeatedly argued the jury should find Ms. Ozuna guilty because only a guilty person would
remain silent. If Ms. Ozuna were innocent, as argued by the prosecutor, she would have waived
her constitutional right and talked to the police during her arrest. These are improper comments
on the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
As this Court has repeatedly held, the prosecutor’s elicitation of testimony and comments
on Ms. Ozuna’s silence constituted misconduct. Johnson, 163 Idaho at 423; Parker, 157 Idaho at
147; Parton, 154 Idaho at 567–68; Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61. “Where a prosecutor attempts to
secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the
evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” See Perry, 150
Idaho at 227; accord Miller, No. 46517, p.8. The prosecutorial misconduct here violated
Ms. Ozuna’s unwaived constitutional rights to silence and due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60. Therefore, Ms. Ozuna has satisfied the first prong of the
Perry/Miller standard to show a constitutional violation.

15

2.

The Error Is Clear From The Record Because The Record Shows The Failure To
Object Was Not Strategic Or Tactical

Next, this error is clear from the record. Ms. Ozuna has met her burden to show plain
error under Perry or the more stringent Miller test. The prosecutor’s presentation of evidence to
the jury on Ms. Ozuna’s silence to infer guilt is plainly impermissible under well-established
United States and Idaho precedent. See, e.g., Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613–14; Johnson, 163 Idaho at
423, Parker, 157 Idaho at 146–47; Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59-61; State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho
709, 713–14 (1999); State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577–79 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Tucker, 138
Idaho 296, 298–99 (Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, there is no legitimate strategic or tactical reason
for defense counsel to choose not to object to such evidence. No reasonable jurist would want
this evidence before the jury because this evidence allows the jury to infer guilt from the
defendant’s exercise of her constitutional rights.
Further, evidence in the record demonstrates Ms. Ozuna’s counsel did not make a tactical
decision not to object. First, Ms. Ozuna’s counsel moved to dismiss the charges pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 (“Rule 29”) after the State’s case-in-chief. (Tr. Vol. I, p.191, L.6–200,
L.3.) Ms. Ozuna’s counsel argued:
Your Honor, you’ve seen all of the evidence that is in front of you, so I will keep
this short. I think in this case so far the only evidence that’s come in is that at
some point my client was in possession of a set of gloves. The interior of the
gloves had a Methamphetamine pipe allegedly inside with alleged residue. I
mean, I suppose, Your Honor, you’ve allowed the testimony in, but I think there
is some question of the accuracy of whether that was the actual substance. As
such, my client can’t be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, I think the
State has failed to prove that my client had any conclusive knowledge of either the
existence of the paraphernalia itself or of the residue on the interior of the pipe. It
is what it is. At this time, I would ask that you dismiss, Your Honor.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.191, L.10–p.192, L.3 (emphasis added).) This argument, in part, indicates defense
counsel’s position that the evidence was insufficient to prove Ms. Ozuna’s knowledge of the pipe
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or residue inside. If Ms. Ozuna’s counsel had recognized that the prosecutor improperly used her
silence to imply guilt not only in opening statements, but also during Officer Parsons’s direct
examination, Ms. Ozuna’s counsel would have objected to this misconduct because exclusion
that argument and testimony would have helped the Rule 29 motion. Defense counsel would
have had a stronger case for acquittal without her silence being used against her. Second,
Ms. Ozuna’s counsel briefly argued in closing:
And I should mention this. The prosecutor keeps alluding to the fact that my
client didn’t protest enough when she was arrested. But you know, this is still
America, isn’t it? Don’t we have that right, when the officer says, “put your hands
behind your back,” to keep your mouth shut? Isn’t that what my client did? Is the
idea here that she should have put up a fight? She should have said other things?
She knew she was under arrest at that point. What good does it do to speak up at
that point? And she didn’t. And the reason she didn’t is she wanted you good
people to hear her side of the story.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.20, L.18–p.21, L.5.) This argument shows that Ms. Ozuna’s counsel (at the last
minute) harbored some concern about the prosecutor’s statements. But, again, Ms. Ozuna’s
counsel did not raise any Fifth Amendment objections to the district court. If Ms. Ozuna’s
counsel had known the prosecutor’s argument actually rose to the misconduct level, Ms. Ozuna’s
counsel would have made those objection known. Exclusion of the prosecutor’s improper
comments and testimony on Ms. Ozuna’s silence would have weakened the prosecutor’s case
and thus benefitted Ms. Ozuna’s defense. Defense counsel’s efforts to challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence and tangentially address the prosecutor’s closing argument show the failure to
object was not strategic or tactical.
In summary, because Ms. Ozuna’s counsel moved for acquittal and attempted to argue
against the prosecutor’s comments in closing, the record clearly shows defense counsel’s failure
to object was not strategic or tactical. If her counsel had known those objections to the
prosecutor’s conduct were available, her counsel would have made them to prevent the
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prosecutor’s impermissible bolstering of its case. Therefore, under Perry or Miller, Ms. Ozuna
has met her burden to show the error plainly exists.

3.

The Error Was Not Harmless Because The Prosecutorial Misconduct Actually
Affected The Trial’s Outcome

Finally, this error was not harmless. Ms. Ozuna’s silence, according to the prosecutor,
signaled a guilty conscience. It informed the jury that Ms. Ozuna did not explain the trash and
gloves situation to Officer Parsons because she knew she was guilty. Yet, the State’s evidence
against Ms. Ozuna was tenuous. The only evidence the State had to prove Ms. Ozuna’s
knowledge of the pipe and residue inside was her possession of the same. As such, this case
came down to a credibility determination between Officer Parsons and Ms. Ozuna—did the jury
believe Officer Parsons’s testimony that a glass pipe with burn residue was unmistakably
sticking out of the gloves, or did the jury believe Ms. Ozuna’s testimony that she did not know
anything was inside the gloves? As such, it is no surprise the prosecutor used Ms. Ozuna’s
silence in opening statements, direct-examination, cross-examination, and closing arguments to
prove Ms. Ozuna’s knowledge and possession. Her silence indicated guilt—an innocent person
would talk; Ms. Ozuna did not. In light of the weak evidence in this case, and the prejudicial
impact of remaining silent (as argued by the prosecutor), Ms. Ozuna has shown the replete
prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the outcome of the trial. See Miller, No. 46517, p.4.7
She respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and remand her case
for a new trial.

7

Ms. Ozuna submits, because she has met the higher Miller standard, she has also met the Perry
standard of a reasonable possibility this error affected the outcome. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
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II.
The Prosecutor Violated Ms. Ozuna’s Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By Eliciting
Testimony Previously Deemed Inadmissible On Ms. Ozuna’s Prior Police Contact

A.

Introduction
Similar to Part I, Ms. Ozuna submits the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting

testimony from Officer Parsons in contravention of the district court’s order on such evidence.
This misconduct violated Ms. Ozuna’s unwaived constitutional right to a fair trial. Although this
error is also unpreserved, this constitutional violation is clear from the record and affected the
trial’s outcome. Due to this fundamental error, Ms. Ozuna respectfully requests that this Court
vacate her judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Ms. Ozuna respectfully refers this Court to the standard of review for fundamental error

in Part I.B of her Appellant’s Brief.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Eliciting Barred Testimony On Ms. Ozuna’s
Prior Police Contact, This Error Is Clear From The Record, And It Is Not Harmless
Ms. Ozuna contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by violating the district

court’s order and eliciting testimony from Officer Parsons on Ms. Ozuna’s prior contact with the
police. This misconduct, though not objected-to, rises to the level of fundamental error. Each
prong of the fundamental error standard will be addressed in turn.

1.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, In Violation Of Ms. Ozuna’s Right To A
Fair Trial, By Contravening The District Court’s Order And Eliciting Testimony
On Ms. Ozuna’s Prior Police Contact

This Court has held that “a violation of a district court’s ruling regarding the admissibility
of evidence constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.” State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 494 (2017)
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(citing Field, 144 Idaho at 572). Such misconduct includes direct violations of the district court’s
ruling as well as “attempts to ‘skirt around the district court’s ruling.’” Id. (quoting Parker, 157
Idaho at 144). This Court holds prosecutors to a higher standard because
[a]s public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure that defendants receive fair
trials.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715 (2009). “They should not ‘exert
their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error,
[because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused.’”
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903)). “[A] prosecutor must
‘guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to
hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.’ A prosecutor must
also ensure that the jury receives only competent evidence.” Severson, 147 Idaho
at 715 (quoting Irwin, 9 Idaho at 44).
Parker, 157 Idaho at 144. Accordingly, a prosecutor engages in misconduct by conveying
information to the jury that the district court had excluded for any purpose. Id. Similarly, a
prosecutor engages in misconduct by “attempting to elicit . . . highly prejudicial and irrelevant”
testimony before discussing that testimony with the district court as promised. Field, 144 Idaho
at 572. Moreover, a prosecutor engages in misconduct by eliciting testimony deemed
inadmissible from a witness even if the witness’s responses were “completed unsolicited and
wholly unnecessary.” Lankford, 162 Idaho at 496 (quoting Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67). “While a
prosecutor certainly cannot be held responsible for every remark a witness might make,” it is
“incumbent upon the prosecutor to conform to the pretrial ruling precluding much of this
inadmissible evidence and to instruct the State’s witnesses to avoid mention of the prohibited
evidence.” Id.
Here, the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony in violation of the
district court’s express ruling. Upon the district court’s ruling that Officer Parsons’s “previous
contacts” with Ms. Ozuna was an “improper statement[ ],” the prosecutor assured the district
court that Officer Parsons would not “volunteer” that information and that “area” was “not to be
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brought up.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.20–p.13, L.8.) Yet on direct examination, the prosecutor asked
Officer Parsons, “How did you identify [Ms. Ozuna]?” and Officer Parsons responded, “I was
able to identify her from a previous contact. So as soon as I saw her, I recognized her.” (Tr. Vol.
I, p.130, Ls.22–4.) Even if the prosecutor did instruct Officer Parsons and Officer Parsons’s
response was “wholly unsolicited,” the prosecutor still engaged in misconduct by eliciting
prejudicial and irrelevant testimony. See Lankford, 162 Idaho at 496. As properly recognized by
the district court, Officer Parsons’s prior contact with Ms. Ozuna was inadmissible evidence: (1)
it was irrelevant under I.R.E. 401 because her identity was not at issue at any point; (2) it was
inadmissible as a prior bad act because it satisfied no I.R.E. 404(b) exception; and (3) and it was
overly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403 because it allowed the jury to infer a bad character or
propensity from prior police contact. It was misconduct for the prosecutor to elicit this testimony
from Officer Parsons.
Similar to comments on silence, this Court has repeatedly held that the prosecutor’s
actions in violation of the district court’s ruling constitutes misconduct. Lankford, 162 Idaho at
496 Parker, 157 Idaho at 144; Field, 144 Idaho at 572. This misconduct violated Ms. Ozuna’s
right to fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; accord Miller,
No. 46517, p.8. As such, Ms. Ozuna has satisfied the first prong of the Perry/Miller standard to
show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right.

2.

The Error Is Clear From The Record Because The Record Shows The Failure To
Object Was Not Tactical Or Strategic

Next, this error is also clear from the record. The district court ruled that certain
testimony was inadmissible, and the prosecutor acted in violation of that ruling. In light of the
district court’s clear ruling, there was no strategic or tactical reasons for defense counsel to fail to
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object. If defense counsel would have objected, defense counsel would have obtained a favorable
ruling from the district court, and the jury would have been instructed to disregard that evidence.
Unlike a situation where defense counsel may not know how the district court would rule on the
evidence’s admissibility, and may not want to risk an objection that piques the jury’s interest,
defense counsel here knew the district court’s ruling, and a simple instruction to disregard could
have easily remedied the error without highlighting the evidence. Therefore, Ms. Ozuna has met
her burden to show plain error under Perry or the more exacting Miller standard.

3.

The Error Was Not Harmless Because The Prosecutorial Misconduct Actually
Affected The Trial’s Outcome

Lastly, this error was not harmless. Although not repeatedly presented to the jury like
Ms. Ozuna’s silence, this evidence of Ms. Ozuna’s prior police conduct was unfairly prejudicial
and irrelevant. It informed the jury that Ms. Ozuna had at least one prior interaction with Officer
Parsons and thus was no stranger to a police investigation. It implied criminal propensity and bad
character. Yet, again, the State’s evidence against Ms. Ozuna was weak, as discussed in Part
I.C.3. The State had little evidence to prove her knowledge of the pipe and residue. But the jury’s
knowledge of Ms. Ozuna’s prior police conduct could go a long way in a case that rose and fell
with witness credibility. In light of the State’s shaky evidence, and the prejudicial impact of a
prior bad act, Ms. Ozuna has shown this prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the outcome
of the trial. See Miller, No. 46517, p.4.8 She respectfully requests that this Court vacate her
judgment of conviction and remand her case for a new trial.

8

Again, Ms. Ozuna submits, because she has met the higher Miller standard, she has also met
the Perry standard of a reasonable possibility this error affected the outcome. Perry, 150 Idaho at
226.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Ozuna respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and
remand her case for a new trial.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2019.
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